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ABSTRACT
Since 2003 in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger the Supreme
Court appeared to have established a relatively stable doctrine for applying
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment in affirmative action
cases. But more recently in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District and Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin the Court
has deviated from the expected results that doctrine would produce while
still claiming to uphold the precedent from Gratz and Grutter. This Article
describes the holdings in Gatz and Grutter, explains how the Court applied
those decisions to Parents Involved and Fisher, and argues the once presumably stable doctrine was modified in 2014 with the Court’s holding in
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.

INTRODUCTION
Gratz v. Bollinger1 and Grutter v. Bollinger2 lay out the current approach
to race-conscious admissions in education. That approach may have been
slightly modified in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District3 and Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,4 although the
Court claimed to have been applying the same standard—strict scrutiny—in
each case. While the Court could modify that approach in subsequent cases,5 the jurisprudence currently appears relatively stable. That appearance is
deceptive, however, because the jurisprudence has already been changed
sub silentio in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary
(BAMN).6
Part I of this Article discusses Grutter, Gratz, Parents Involved, and
Fisher, noting how the same legal standard was applied when assessing the
constitutionality of school policies employing express racial classifications
to help determine who would be afforded an opportunity to attend a particular school. Whether the Court’s application of the standard was consistent
across cases is controversial,7 although the Court at least claimed to be ap-

1

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249–51, 280 (2003).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311, 343 (2003).
3
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007).
4
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421-22 (2013).
5
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2209-10 (2016).
6
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1650-1651 (2014).
7
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (“Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for
2
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plying strict scrutiny across the board. Part II examines Schuette, noting
how the Court subverts the accepted jurisprudence while claiming to apply
it. The Article concludes that the Court must correct Schuette at its earliest
opportunity, because the current jurisprudence exemplifies exactly what
equal protections guarantees are designed to prevent.
I. SCHOOL ADMISSIONS AND STRICT SCRUTINY
The United States Supreme Court has examined several cases involving
policies employing an express racial classification as a consideration in determining who would receive an offer to attend a particular school.8 In each
of the cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny. In three of those cases, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the system at issue; in the others, the
Court either remanded the case or struck down the policy.9 The differing
results were at least arguably attributable to differences in the particular
admissions policies employed by the state entities whose policies were
challenged or, perhaps, a misapplication of the doctrine by a lower court.
A. Gratz and Grutter
Gratz involved an examination of the admissions policies of the University of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts.10 To assure
acceptance, an applicant needed to have the requisite number of points on a
scale of 150.11 Students receiving at least 100 points would receive an offer
of admission.12 Points would be earned in a variety of categories.13 Students

taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of
the university. Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a
university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”); but see Grutter, 134 S. Ct.
at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court, however, does not apply strict scrutiny. By trying to say
otherwise, it undermines both the test and its own controlling precedents.”).
8See generally Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244 (2003) ; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18 (1999);
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974).
9 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (showing where the Court upholds the race-based
policy held by the school’s admissions); but see, Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18 (1999); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (showing where the Court remands or strikes down the race-based policy held by the school’s admissions).
10
See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 257 (“Petitioners asserted that the LSA's use of race as a factor in admissions
violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
11
Id. at 255.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 253. (OUA [Office of Undergraduate Admissions] considers a number of factors in making admissions decisions, including high school grades, standardized test scores, high school quality, curriculum strength, geography, alumni relationships, and leadership.").
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belonging to a qualifying underrepresented minority group would receive
20 points by virtue of their minority status.14 In contrast, a student with
“‘extraordinary artistic talent’ rival[ing] that of Monet or Picasso … would
receive, at most, five points.”15
The Gratz Court explained, “[A]ll racial classifications reviewable under
the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized.”16 Further, the appropriate “standard of review [...] is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.”17 Thus, any individual “of
whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject
to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to
unequal treatment under the strictest of judicial scrutiny.”18 Such scrutiny is
very difficult to withstand because those defending the classification “must
demonstrate that the University's use of race in its current admissions program employs ‘narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.’”19 The Court found that “because the University's use of
race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to
achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”20
Justice O’Connor explained in her concurring opinion that “the procedures employed by the University of Michigan's […] Office of Undergraduate Admissions do not provide for a meaningful individualized review of
applicants.”21 Because “every underrepresented minority applicant [was assigned] the same, automatic 20–point bonus without consideration of the
particular background, experiences, or qualities of each individual applicant,”22 the admissions decision for each applicant was “by and large, automatically determine[d].”23
Just as the majority opinion suggested that race was overvalued compared to artistic talent,24 Justice O’Connor implied that the Admissions Of-

14
Id. at 271. ("The LSA's policy automatically distributes 20 points to every single applicant from an
underrepresented minority' group, as defined by the University.").
15
Id. at 273.
16
See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)).
17
Id. (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224).
18
Id. (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224).
19
Id. (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224).
20
Id. at 275.
21
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
22
Id. at 276-77 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
23
Id. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
24 See id. at 273.
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fice had not assigned appropriate weights to the different categories.25 “Although the Office of Undergraduate Admissions does assign 20 points to
some ‘soft’ variables other than race, the points available for other diversity
contributions, such as leadership and service, personal achievement, and
geographic diversity, are capped at much lower levels.”26 For example, “the
most outstanding national high school leader could never receive more than
five points for his or her accomplishments—a mere quarter of the points automatically assigned to an underrepresented minority solely based on the
fact of his or her race.”27 Here, Justice O’Connor was at least implicitly
suggesting that the University was overvaluing race as compared to some of
the other categories upon which points would be awarded.
Some racial classifications are permissible,28 although benign and animus-based racial classifications are subject to the same strict scrutiny.
When closely examining the methods employed by the University, the
Gratz Court apparently felt obliged to decide for itself which categories
were worthy of receiving (up to) 20 points and which should receive fewer.29 In addition, the Court implicitly and Justice O’Connor explicitly suggested that there must be individualized differentiation within each category.30 Thus, Justice O’Connor criticized Michigan’s program because “every
underrepresented minority applicant [was assigned] the same, automatic
20–point bonus without consideration of the particular background, experiences, or qualities of each individual applicant.”31 She implied that it was
important for admissions committees to “consider[] […] each applicant's
individualized qualifications, including the contribution each individual's
race or ethnic identity will make to the diversity of the student body, taking
into account diversity within and among all racial and ethnic groups.”32

See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring) ([T]he selection index, by setting up automatic,
predetermined point allocations for the soft variables, ensures that the diversity contributions of applicants cannot be individually assessed. This policy stands in sharp contrast to the law school’s admissions
plan, which enables admissions officers to make nuanced judgments with respect to the contributions
each applicant is likely to make to the diversity of the incoming class.”).
26 Id.
27
Id.
28
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 ([T]he Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.”).
29
But see Gratz, 539 U.S. at 294 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“A nonminority applicant who scores highly in
these other categories can readily garner a selection index exceeding that of a minority applicant who
gets the 20-point bonus.”).
30
Cf. id. at 293 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Grutter reaffirms the permissibility of individualized consideration of race to achieve a diversity of students, at least where race is not assigned a preordained value in
all cases.”).
31
Id. at 276–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
32
Id. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
25
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While Justice O’Connor was correct that the undergraduate admissions
committee was using a kind of toggle switch in that a student would either
be awarded twenty points or no points in this category, it is simply unclear
what kinds of distinctions should be made when deciding how many points
to award. Would someone who was bi-racial or multi-racial receive fewer
points or more points? Which minority racial identities should increase/decrease points?33 Should minorities whose skin color is darker receive more points?34 Perhaps the committee should assign differing numbers of points based on its assumptions about how particular minorities
would contribute to viewpoint diversity,35 although the Court has been
quick to criticize those who would attribute to a student a particular point of
view on the basis of his/her race.36
Gratz is helpfully contrasted with Grutter v. Bollinger, which involved
the admissions policies of the University of Michigan Law School.37 Admissions personnel would “evaluate each applicant based on all the information available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of recommendation, and an essay describing the ways in which the applicant will
contribute to the life and diversity of the Law School.”38 As a testament to
the individualized nature of the assessment, the Court noted that “even the
highest possible [credentials] score does not guarantee admission to the
Law School”39 and, by the same token, “a low score [does not] automatically disqualify an applicant.”40
The Law School sought “to ensure that a critical mass of underrepresented minority students would be reached so as to realize the educational bene-

33

Cf. Gayle Pollack, The Role of Race in Child Custody Decisions Between Natural Parents over Biracial Children, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 603, 620 (1997) (“Biracial people may feel pressured
to identify more strongly with their minority race … . [Or, they] may reject or negatively stereotype
their minority heritage in an attempt to lay claim to what they may see as their part of the dominant majority.”).
34
Cf. Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1490–91 (2000)
(“Studies show, however, that Blacks in positions of prominence and authority tend to be lighterskinned. Thus, some employers may be hiring only a subset of the Black population, a subset selected,
in part, based on skin color.”).
35
Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319–20 (discussing testimony suggesting that “when a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority students.”).
36
Cf. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (“It cannot be entertained as a serious proposition that all individuals
of the same race think alike.”).
37
539 U.S. at 311 (“This case requires us to decide whether the use of race as a factor in student admissions by the University of Michigan Law School (Law School) is unlawful.”).
38
Id. at 315.
39
Id.
40
Id.
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fits of a diverse student body.”41 However, that did not mean that there was
a “particular number or percentage of underrepresented minority students”42 that had to be admitted. Nonetheless, having a critical mass of minority of students was important for a variety of reasons. For example,
“when a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn there is
no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority
students.”43
The Grutter Court reaffirmed the applicability of the standard discussed
in Gratz.44 Thus, “all racial classifications imposed by government ‘must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny,’”45 which “means that
such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to
further compelling governmental interests.”46 The Court expressly refused
to use a different level of scrutiny for a racial classification claimed to be
benign rather than invidious.47 “‘Absent searching judicial inquiry into the
justification for such race-based measures,’ we have no way to determine
what ‘classifications are “benign” or “remedial” and what classifications are
in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics.’”48
The Grutter Court explained “the Law School has a compelling interest
in attaining a diverse student body.”49 But even where the implicated state
interest is compelling, government is still “constrained in how it may pursue that end.”50 Unlike the program used by the University of Michigan in
undergraduate admissions, “the Law School's admissions program bears the
hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan.”51 That system did “not operate as a
quota.”52
Merely because the Law School’s admissions criteria did not operate as a
quota did not end the analysis, because “a university's admissions program
must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an
individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the

41

Id. at 318.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318.
43
Id. at 319-20.
44 Id. at 343-44.
45
Id. at 326 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
46
Id.
47 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-27.
48
Id. (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
49
Id. at 328.
50
Id. at 333 (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)).
51
Id. at 334.
52
Id. at 335.
42
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defining feature of his or her application.”53 How could the Court be sure
that race was not being weighed too heavily? The Court noted that the “Law
School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test
scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants (and other nonminority applicants) who are rejected,”54 and then concluded that the “Law
School's current admissions program considers race as one factor among
many, in an effort to assemble a student body that is diverse in ways broader than race.”55
In the Court’s eyes, the Law School was not assigning inordinate
weight56 to race because non-minority students with comparatively worse
credentials were receiving offers of admission when minorities with better
credentials were not.57 Nonetheless, it was not especially clear how the Law
School admissions committee was operating, for example, whether race was
given less comparable weight as a general matter or, instead, whether race
was given much weight in some cases and less weight in others.58 Nor was
it clear whether the reason that some qualified minority applicants were refused admission to the law school but no qualified minority applicants were
refused admission to the College59 was due to the admissions committee
practices or, instead, to the quality of the minority applicant pool at the College level.60
Gratz and Grutter raised but did not answer a variety of questions, for
example, when an institution was placing too much weight on racial diversity.61 A separate issue involves the degree of deference that educational in-

53

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
Id. at 338.
55
Id. at 340.
56
Id. at 341; see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 296 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Any argument that the ‘tailoring’ amounts to a set-aside, then, boils down to the claim that a plus factor of 20 points makes some
observers suspicious, where a factor of 10 points might not.”); but see Gratz, 539 U.S. at 280
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (illustrating how the majority in Gratz believed that too much weight was
assigned to race).
57 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
58 Cf. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-73 ("The LSA's policy automatically distributes 20 points to every single
applicant from an underrepresented minority' group, as defined by the University."), and Gratz, 539 U.S.
at 273-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing how much weight was given in the undergraduate context and the undergraduate committee’s refusal to vary how many points race would receive in individual cases).
59
See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 254 (“[I]t is undisputed that the University admits ‘virtually every qualified ...
applicant’ from these [minority] groups.”).
60
See id. at 296 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that the university admits ‘virtually every qualified
under- represented minority applicant’ may reflect nothing more than the likelihood that very few qualified minority applicants apply . . . .”).
61 Cf. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing Justice O’Connor’s implicit if not
explicit criticism that too much weight was being assigned to race).
54
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stitutions should receive from the Court.62 An issue not raised in Grutter
and Gratz is whether elementary and secondary schools employing racial
classifications in admissions decisions should receive deference with respect to their assessments of the need for school diversity.63 That issue,
among others, was addressed in Parents Involved.64
B. Parents Involved
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District involved a constitutional challenge to public school districts that “voluntarily
adopted student assignment plans that rely upon race to determine which
public schools certain children may attend.”65 The Seattle and Louisville
school districts whose policies were at issue had somewhat differing approaches.66
In Seattle, students were allowed to list the public high schools “in order
of preference.”67 Some schools were more popular than others.68 If a school
was oversubscribed, certain tiebreakers were used. First, an individual with
a sibling in the school would be given preference.69 Second, if the school’s
racial composition was outside of the desired range, then individuals who
would help the school achieve greater diversity would be given preference.70 Third, if the previous tiebreakers were not dispositive, geographical
proximity to the school would then be used as the tiebreaker.71 The plurality
noted that while Seattle had never been subject to a court-ordered desegregation plan and had never been found by a court to have operated racially
segregated schools,72 it had nonetheless adopted the plan to combat “the ef-

62

Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (“The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential
to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”).
63 See Generally Mark Strasser, Was Brown's Declaration of Per Se Invalidity Really Out of the Blue?
The Evolving "Separate but Equal" Education Jurisprudence from Cumming to Brown, 47 How. L.J.
769 (2004) (discussing how the Court has treated race-conscious decisions in college and post-graduate
education versus primary and secondary schools).
64 See infra Section B.
65
551 U.S. 701, 709-10 (2007).
66
Id. at 711 (“[T]he specifics of the two plans, and the circumstances surrounding their adoption, are in
some respects quite different.”).
67
Id.
68
Id. (“Some schools are more popular than others.”).
69
Id. at 711-12 (“The first tiebreaker selects for admission students who have a sibling currently enrolled in the chosen school.”).
70
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 712 (“If an oversubscribed school is not within 10 percentage points of
the district's overall white/nonwhite racial balance, it is what the district calls ‘integration positive,’ and
the district employs a tiebreaker that selects for assignment students whose race ‘will serve to bring the
school into balance.’”).
71
Id. (“If it is still necessary to select students for the school after using the racial tiebreaker, the next
tiebreaker is the geographic proximity of the school to the student's residence.”).
72
Id. (“Seattle has never operated segregated schools—legally separate schools for students of different
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fects of racially identifiable housing patterns on school assignments.”73
In contrast, the Louisville school system was found to maintain a segregated school system and was under court supervision.74 However, that supervision ended in 2000.75
Under the Louisville plan at issue in Parents Involved, each elementary
school student was assigned a “resides” school based on where he or she
lived.76 Students would be assigned to a non-magnet school based on their
articulated preferences.77 However, if a school “has reached the ‘extremes
of the racial guidelines,’”78 a student who would contribute to an even
greater racial imbalance would not be assigned to that school.79
When evaluating the constitutionality of the systems before it, the plurality articulated the same standard that had been used in Gratz and Grutter:
“In order to satisfy this searching standard of review, the school districts
must demonstrate that the use of individual racial classifications in the assignment plans here under review is ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest.”80 The plurality then sought to show that the
governing standard had not been met.81
As an initial point, the plurality noted that neither system could claim
that the policy was an attempt to combat the invidious effects of prior intentional segregation,82 emphasizing that Seattle had never been under court
supervision83 and that Louisville no longer was.84 The plurality then examined whether the race-based decision-making could be justified on another
basis.
Both school districts argued that “educational and broader socialization

races—nor has it ever been subject to court-ordered desegregation.”).
73
Id. (“[T]he effects of racially identifiable housing patterns on school assignments.”).
74
Id. at 715.
75 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 715-16.
76
Id. at 716 (“At the elementary school level, based on his or her address, each student is designated a
‘resides’ school to which students within a specific geographic area are assigned.”).
77
Id. (“Parents of kindergartners, first graders, and students new to the district may submit an application indicating a first and second choice among the schools within their cluster.”).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 716-17. (“If a school has reached the ‘extremes of the racial guidelines,’ a student whose race
would contribute to the school's racial imbalance will not be assigned there.” (quoting App. in No. 05915, at 38-39, 82)).
80
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227).
81 See id. at 720-21.
82 Id.
83
Id. at 720 (“Yet the Seattle public schools have not shown that they were ever segregated by law, and
were not subject to court-ordered desegregation decrees.”).
84
Id. at 721 (“Once Jefferson County achieved unitary status, it had remedied the constitutional wrong
that allowed race-based assignments. Any continued use of race must be justified on some other basis.”).
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benefits flow from a racially diverse learning environment, and each [district] contends that because the diversity they seek is racial diversity […] it
makes sense to promote that interest directly by relying on race alone.”85
The Parents Involved plurality rejected that the school districts’ announced
ends passed constitutional muster.86 “However closely related race-based
assignments may be to achieving racial balance, that itself cannot be the
goal, whether labeled ‘racial diversity’ or anything else.”87 Rather than being the goal, racial diversity would have to be the means to achieve other
desired goals.88 But the plurality rejected that the means adopted by the districts met the narrow tailoring requirement.89 Indeed, the plurality believed
the method chosen by the school districts undercut rather than promoted the
stated goals,90 and summed up its understanding of the best approach to
achieving equal treatment on the basis of race by writing: “The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race.”91
Unlike the more deferential approach adopted by the Court in the case
involving the University of Michigan Law School, the plurality rejected out
of hand that deference should be accorded to local school boards. “Such
deference ‘is fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence.
We put the burden on state actors to demonstrate that their race-based policies are justified.’”92
In his Parents Involved concurrence, Justice Kennedy suggested that
“[d]iversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling educational goal a school district may pursue.”93 While rejecting the methods
adopted by these school districts, he would be open, “if necessary, [to] a
more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that might include race as a component.”94
Justice Kennedy advised school districts to adopt approaches that did not

85

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 at 725-26.
Id. at 726.
87
Id. at 733.
88 Id. at 733.
89
Id. at 726 (“[I]t is clear that the racial classifications employed by the districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity.”).
90
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 733 (“To the extent the objective is sufficient diversity so that students
see fellow students as individuals rather than solely as members of a racial group, using means that treat
students solely as members of a racial group is fundamentally at cross-purposes with that end.”).
91
Id. at 748.
92
Id. at 744. (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 n.1 (2005).
93
Id. at 783. (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
94
Id. at 790.
86
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“tell[] each student he or she is to be defined by race.”95 While such programs might be “race conscious,”96 he nonetheless thought it unlikely “any
of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.”97 For example, he suggested:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse
backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic site selection
of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments,
98
performance, and other statistics by race.

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence makes it somewhat difficult to understand the current jurisprudence in that he would find certain practices constitutionally permissible that would presumably be found unconstitutional
by the Parents Involved plurality.99 It is unclear whether the practices
whose constitutionality he would uphold are only those outlined that allegedly do not trigger strict scrutiny100 or whether in addition he would uphold
certain “necessary […] nuanced [policies] […] that might include race as a
component”101 even if triggering strict scrutiny. In any event, he left the
door open to use race as a factor,102 although the next opinion he authored
in this area cast doubt on his openness to employing express racial classifications in the educational admissions context.103
C. Fisher
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,104 the Court again examined
95

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789.
Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99
Michael C. Dorf, Foreward: The Most Confusing Branch, 45 TULSA L. REV. 191, 192 (2009) (“Justice Kennedy split the difference. He would have permitted race-conscious measures that the plurality’s
reasoning would have forbidden.).
100 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is clear that the racial classifications
employed by the districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social
benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity.”).
101
Id. at 790 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
102
Matthew Scutari, Note, “The Great Equalizer”: Making Sense of the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence in American Public Education and Beyond, 97 GEO. L.J. 917, 938 (2009) (“Justice
Kennedy’s controlling opinion suggests that race-conscious measures could be employed to achieve
certain compelling interests, including avoiding racial isolation in schools and promoting diversity”).
103
Eboni S. Nelson, Reading Between the Blurred Lines of Fisher v. University of Texas, 48 VAL. U. L.
REV. 519, 522-23 (2014) (“If and when the current Court considers the constitutionality of future racebased admissions policies, including that challenged in Fisher, it is doubtful that Justice Kennedy will be
affirmative action’s saving grace as many have hoped.)”; See generally Jonathan W. Rash, Affirmative
Action on Life Support: Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin and the End of Not-So-Strict-Scrutiny, 8
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 25 (2002).
104 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
96
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the use of race in the higher education context, this time by the University
of Texas at Austin. The university made use of the Top Ten program, which
“grants automatic admission to any public state college, including the University, to all students in the top 10% of their class at high schools in Texas
that comply with certain standards.”105 To supplement their consideration
of grades and test scores, the University also considered a “‘Personal
Achievement Index’ (PAI), [which] measures a student's leadership and
work experience, awards, extracurricular activities, community service, and
other special circumstances that give insight into a student's background.”106 That program was helpful in increasing the diversity of the student population.107
After the United States Supreme Court issued Grutter, the University of
Texas modified its admissions process.108 This modification included express consideration of race in the PAI.109 When examining the University’s
use of race, the Fisher Court reaffirmed the appropriate standard: “Race
may not be considered unless the admissions process can withstand strict
scrutiny.”110 The Court also reaffirmed that strict scrutiny is a daunting test.
“Strict scrutiny is a searching examination, and it is the government that
bears the burden to prove ‘that the reasons for any [racial] classification
[are] clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate.’”111
The Court noted that strict scrutiny would be employed when examining
both the end sought and the means used to achieve that end.112 “Once the
University has established that its goal of diversity is consistent with strict
scrutiny, however, there must still be a further judicial determination that
the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its implementation.”113 For
example, the reviewing court must “verify that it is ‘necessary’ for a university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.”114

105

Id. at 2416.
Id. at 2415-16.
107
Id. at 2416 (“The University’s revised admissions process, coupled with the operation of the Top
Ten Percent Law, resulted in a more racially diverse environment at the University.”).
108
Id. (“Following this Court’s decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger . . . and Gratz v. Bollinger . . . the University adopted a third admissions program . . . .”).
109
133 S. Ct. at 2416 (“[T]he University included a student’s race as a component of the PAI score . . .
.”).
110
Id. at 2418.
111
Id. at 2419 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989)).
112 See id. at 2420 (“The University must prove that the means chosen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal.”); See id. at 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he educational
benefits allegedly produced by diversity must rise to the level of a compelling state interest in order for
the program to survive strict scrutiny.”).
113
Id. at 2419-20.
114
133 S. Ct. at 2420 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978)).
106
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The Fisher Court noted that the Fifth Circuit had been rather deferential,
only requiring that the University acted in good faith.115 However, the
Court explained, “Grutter did not hold that good faith would forgive an impermissible consideration of race.”116 The Court remanded the case to the
Fifth Circuit.117
On remand, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the constitutionality of the University of Texas approach.118 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Fifth Circuit’s holding was correct,119 and
affirmed.120
The Fisher II Court reiterated that racial classifications must be examined with strict scrutiny121 and that no deference would be given to universities with respect to whether their chosen means is narrowly tailored to
promoting diversity.122 Ultimately, the Court found that the particular system at issue passed muster, perhaps because it was sui generis.123 That said,
merely because the University of Texas policy survived this challenge does
not mean that the same policy would survive a constitutional challenge ten
years from now because the University has a “continuing obligation to satisfy the burden of strict scrutiny in light of changing circumstances.”124
The jurisprudence from Grutter and Gratz through Parents Involved and
Fisher suggests that race-conscious admissions procedures in education are
constitutionally permissible under certain conditions. Because the Court
does not distinguish between benign and animus-based racial discrimination, express racial classifications will be examined with strict scrutiny.
Such classifications will be struck down as violating equal protection guarantees unless narrowly tailored to promote compelling state interests. However, Schuette may modify that understanding.

115
See id. (“[T]he Court of Appeals held petitioner could challenge only ‘whether [the University’s]
decision to reintroduce race as a factor in admission was made in good faith.’” (citing Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 236 (5th Cir. 2011))).
116
Id. at 2421.
117
Id. at 2422 (“The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.”).
118
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758, 633, 660 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2888
(2015).
119
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015) (granting certiorari).
120
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016).
121 See id. at 2208.
122 Id.
123 See id.
124
Id. at 2209–2210.
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II. SCHUETTE AND EQUAL PROTECTION
The state of Michigan adopted by referendum a constitutional amendment that, inter alia, precluded discriminating against or granting preferential treatment to anyone on the basis of his or her race. That amendment was
challenged as a violation of federal equal protection guarantees. When upholding the constitutionality of the amendment, the United States Supreme
Court offered an analysis that was difficult to understand in light of the prevailing jurisprudence.
A. Schuette
At issue in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action was the
constitutionality of a state constitutional amendment adopted by referendum.125 The amendment read:
(1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University, and any other public college or university, community college, or
school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.
(2) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public con126
tracting.

On its face, the amendment classifies on the basis of race, among other
categories, and an important determination involves the level of scrutiny
that should be employed when examining the constitutionality of the enactment. While the plurality did not provide an analysis that was as clear
and detailed as one might like with respect to the appropriate standard of
review, the Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that strict scrutiny
was triggered,127 and it will be helpful to see why.
The Sixth Circuit had read Washington v. Seattle School District128 as
holding that “any state action with a ‘racial focus’ that makes it ‘more difficult for certain racial minorities than for other groups’ to ‘achieve legisla-

125
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action et al., 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014) (“The Court
in this case must determine whether an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Michigan, approved and enacted by its voters, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”).
126 Id. (citing Mich. Const. art. I, § 26).
127 See id. at 1634.
128
458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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tion that is in their interest’ is subject to strict scrutiny.”129 The Schuette
plurality criticized that approach as likely inconsistent with the current jurisprudence.130 After all, talking about which legislation is in a particular
group’s interest suggests a uniformity of interests that might not exist.131
In cautioning against “impermissible racial stereotypes,” this Court has rejected
the assumption that “members of the same racial group—regardless of their
age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live—think
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at
132
the polls.”

The plurality further cautioned, “[I]f it were deemed necessary to probe
how some races define their own interest in political matters, still another
beginning point would be to define individuals according to race.”133 But
such a project would itself pose significant problems. “[I]n a society in
which those lines are becoming more blurred, the attempt to define racebased categories also raises serious questions of its own.”134
Even if those problems could be solved, there would be additional difficulties in determining which policies benefited particular groups. Allegedly,
the Sixth Circuit approach “would risk … the creation of incentives for
those who support or oppose certain policies to cast the debate in terms of
racial advantage or disadvantage.”135
Consider how different groups react to affirmative action policies. Some
believe they are not only beneficial but necessary,136 whereas others claim
such policies are harmful.137 Whether employing racial classifications is
more beneficial than harmful is an empirical matter.138

129

Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (citing Seattle, 458 U.S. at 474).
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (“The expansive reading of Seattle has no principled limitation and raises serious questions of compatibility with the Court’s settled equal protection jurisprudence.”).
131
Id. at 1634. (“It cannot be entertained as a serious proposition that all individuals of the same race
think alike.”).
132
Id. (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)).
133
Id.
134
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634.
135
Id. at 1635.
136
See William B. Turner, “A Bulwark Against Anarchy”: Affirmative Action, Emory Law School, and
Southern Self-Help, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 195, 247 (2008) (discussing the view that affirmative action is both beneficial and necessary).
137
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that affirmative action programs can be “poisonous and pernicious” and “stamp minorities with
a badge of inferiority”).
138
See Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697, 698 (1999) (reviewing
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS. (1990) (“[T]he authors demonstrate
that the benefits of affirmative action far outweigh the costs, suggesting that affirmative action is, indeed, a desirable social bargain. This is not to suggest… that affirmative action is costless or a panacea
130
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The Schuette plurality suggested the Constitution does not require or
even permit the cost/benefit assessment of racial preferences to be decided
by the courts rather than the electorate.139 Indeed, the suggestion that this
was not a matter to be left to the voters was “demeaning to the democratic
process,”140 because taking such a decision away from the electorate would
“presume that the voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.”141
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts asserted both that reasonable
people might disagree about whether affirmative action is more beneficial
than harmful142 and that impugning the motivation of those criticizing racial
preferences was itself harmful.143 He seemed especially interested in rejecting the proposition that “it is […] ‘out of touch with reality’ to conclude
that racial preferences may themselves […] do more harm than good.”144
Justice Scalia in his concurrence asked rhetorically, “Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbid what its text plainly requires?”145 Echoing his concurring and dissenting opinion in Grutter, Justice Scalia suggested that the “Constitution proscribes government
discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no exception.”146 He rejected that a compelling interest in diversity permits a
university to employ a racial classification.147
Members of the Court clearly disagree about whether race-conscious policies promote more harm than good.148 Yet, a more basic question for con-

for our social ills--it is neither.“).
139
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638 (“There is no authority in the Constitution of the United States or in this
Court’s precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit this policy determination to
the voters.” (citing Sailors v. Board of Ed. of City of Kent, 387 U.S. 105, 109 (1967)).
140 Id. at 1637.
141 Id.
142
Id. at 1639 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“People can disagree in good faith on this issue.”).
143
Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[I]t similarly does more harm than good to question the openness
and candor of those on either side of the debate.”).
144
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638-39 (quoting Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1675-76 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
145
Id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
146
Id. (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147
Cf. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“The petitioner in this case
did not ask us to overrule Grutter’s holding that a ‘compelling interest’ in the educational benefits of
diversity can justify racial preferences in university admissions. I therefore join the Court’s opinion in
full.”).
148
Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Beyond
the harm the Law School’s racial discrimination visits upon its test subjects, no social science has disproved the notion that this discrimination ‘engender[s] attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke[s] resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s use of
race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ top references.”) (citation omitted) (quoting
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and con-
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stitutional purposes is whether the Michigan amendment employs a racebased classification and, if so, whether that classification triggers strict
scrutiny.
B. What Counts as a Racial Classification?
The current equal protection jurisprudence requires strict scrutiny of all
racial classifications.149 The Michigan amendment expressly incorporated
race as a forbidden category upon which to award benefits or impose burdens, and a basic question is whether the express inclusion of race itself operates as a racial classification. The plurality implicitly and Justice Scalia
explicitly denied that the Michigan amendment classified on the basis of
race, and that denial must be explored.
Justice Scalia addressed the question directly, noting the respondents argued it was unnecessary to discern whether the Michigan electorate had
passed the amendment out of animus, because “§ 26 may be struck more
straightforwardly as a racial ‘classification.’”150 He quickly dismissed that
contention because “§ 26 does not on its face ‘distribut[e] burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications.’”151 Because in his view
there was no distribution of benefits or burdens on that basis, the amendment should be treated as if it were racially neutral. He continued, “[T]he
question in this case, as in every case in which neutral state action is said to
deny equal protection on account of race, is whether the action reflects a racially discriminatory purpose.”152
In what sense was the amendment neutral? It prohibited using race as a
plus factor or as a minus factor when deciding who would receive an offer
of admission. In what way was this not neutral? Other groups would not
need to pass a state constitutional amendment before they could receive
preferential treatment on their preferred basis. Thus, Justice Scalia was correct that the Michigan amendment was neutral in that it did not privilege
one race over another, but incorrect in that one classification (race) could
not be used as a basis for preferential treatment in admissions while other

curring in the judgment)), with Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1680 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The elimination of race-sensitive admissions policies in California has been especially harmful to black students.”).
149
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (“[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.”).
150
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1647-48 (Scalia, J., concurring).
151
Id. at 1648 (alteration in original) (citing Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007)).
152 Id. at 1648 (Scalia, J., concurring).

http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol20/iss1/3

18

Strasser: Affirmative Action Invidiousness

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION INVIDIOUSNESS

19

bases (geography, income) could be so used.153
If the Michigan amendment was neutral in one sense but not in another,
then it is important to figure out which sense of neutrality is used in equal
protection jurisprudence. Consider Hunter v. Erickson.154 At issue was the
following city charter amendment adopted by referendum:
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates
the use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real property of any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the electors voting on the question at a regular or general election before said ordinance shall be effective. Any such ordinance in effect at the time
of the adoption of this section shall cease to be effective until approved by the
155
electors as provided herein.

The charter amendment did not itself directly accord benefits or impose
burdens on the basis of race, and the Hunter Court recognized the amendment was neutral within certain categories. “It is true that the section draws
no distinctions among racial and religious groups. Negroes and whites,
Jews and Catholics are all subject to the same requirements if there is housing discrimination against them which they wish to end.”156 Using Justice
Scalia’s sense of neutrality, the Akron amendment was neutral. But the
Hunter Court examined this amendment with strict scrutiny, viewing it as a
racial classification.157 In what way was it harmful? Certain groups could
only receive protections from the City after securing voter ratification of
those protections, while other groups did not need voter ratification to make
city council protections effective. When striking down the amendment, the
Hunter Court noted, “[T]he State may no more disadvantage any particular
group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it
may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than
another of comparable size.”158
It is fair to suggest that in some ways Hunter no longer represents the
current jurisprudence. The Hunter Court struck down the amendment because it “discriminates against minorities, and constitutes a real, substantial,
and invidious denial of the equal protection of the laws.”159 But the current
153

See id. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“As a result of § 26, there are now two very different
processes through which a Michigan citizen is permitted to influence the admissions policies of the
State's universities: one for persons interested in race-sensitive admissions policies and one for everyone
else.”).
154 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
155
Id. at 387.
156
Id. at 390.
157 See id. at 391-92.
158
Id. at 393 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
159
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 385 (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533).
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jurisprudence neither requires nor permits the Court to decide whether statutes containing express racial classifications are more beneficial than harmful. Instead, the current jurisprudence requires all such statutes to be examined with strict scrutiny,160 which is why it was somewhat surprising for
some of the Court members to air their differing views about the costs and
benefits of racial preferences.161 According to the current jurisprudence, it
does not matter whether the justices believe race-conscious admission policies a good idea or a bad one—strict scrutiny is triggered in either event.162
The position offered here that the Michigan amendment should have
been subjected to strict scrutiny might seem open to the following objection: If a state constitutional amendment bars discrimination on the basis of
race, then its having expressly included race in the state constitution would
trigger strict scrutiny, which would mean the state constitution provision
could not include such a provision unless narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling interest. But it would seem absurd to strike down a state constitutional provision barring racial discrimination.
Yet, there are a number of reasons this objection proves unavailing. First,
suppose such a prohibition did trigger strict scrutiny. The Court would presumably say that prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race was narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest.
Second, if indeed the state constitutional amendment was simply mirroring Fourteenth Amendment protections and if the state constitutional
amendment was interpreted in a way that tracked Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection guarantees, then Justice Scalia’s rhetorical question would
seem apt. “Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
forbid what its text plainly requires?”163 Presumably, the Fourteenth
Amendment would not invalidate a state measure that merely reiterated federal constitutional requirements.
Suppose for whatever reason the Court would strike down a state constitutional provision barring racial discrimination if that amendment had to be
subjected to strict scrutiny. Even if the Fourteenth Amendment were interpreted to require invalidation of a state constitutional provision mirroring
federal requirements, that would merely mean the state would still have to

160
See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1674 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Justice Scalia . . . would acknowledge .
. . that an act that draws racial distinctions or makes racial classifications triggers strict scrutiny regardless of whether discriminatory intent is shown. That should settle the matter: Section 26 draws a racial
distinction.”).
161 See supra notes 133-38, 140-45 and accompanying text; See also supra note 139 (Roberts, J., concurring) (citing Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
162 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1663 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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abide by the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment rather than
being forced to abide by the requirements because of both federal and state
constitutional guarantees.
The qualification above about the state amendment mirroring federal
guarantees must be emphasized because it suggests where Justice Scalia’s
analysis is in error. Even without the Michigan amendment, Michigan state
universities could not accord preferences based on race unless narrowly tailored to promote compelling state interests. To the extent the Michigan
amendment merely prohibits what the Fourteenth Amendment bars anyway,
the state constitutional amendment has no real effect. But the Michigan
amendment precludes according preferences on race even when doing so is
narrowly tailored to promote compelling state interests, which is going
above and beyond what the Fourteenth Amendment requires. Basically, the
Michigan amendment precludes the state from affording benefits on the basis of race that would be permissible under the Federal Constitution, and
such a denial of possible benefits should have been examined with strict
scrutiny.164 It is difficult to see how denying the possibility that minorities
might receive additional educational benefits would be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling state interest. Thus, although Justice Scalia is correct
that the Fourteenth Amendment would not bar a state from having within its
own constitution a provision mirroring the requirements of the Federal
Constitution, he is incorrect to imply that a state constitutional provision
would be immune from invalidation if that provision denied opportunities
to minorities that were permissibly accorded in light of federal constitutional guarantees.165
CONCLUSION
The Court has decided several cases involving express consideration of
race in school admissions and in each case employed strict scrutiny when
evaluating the constitutionality of the policy at issue.166 The Court has expressly rejected distinguishing between benign and animus- based classifications, believing that all racial classifications must be subjected to exacting
consideration. Such a policy has costs, since it means that the state cannot
adopt race-based programs unless those programs are narrowly tailored to
promote compelling interests.
In Schuette, the plurality ignored its own jurisprudence to achieve a re-

164

Id. at 1663 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1673 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S.
457, 487 (1982)).
166 See, e.g., Fisher, 134 S. Ct. at 2415; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
165

Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017

21

Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3

22

RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW

sult, which at least some suggest is racially discriminatory.167 For example,
the plurality refused to impute animus to the electorate when adopting the
amendment at issue by referendum.168 But the Court has already eschewed
treating benignly motivated racial classification more deferentially, so it
should not matter why the electorate adopted the measure. So, too, the discussion about whether race-conscious measures benefit or harm racial minorities was also beside the point. Whether helping or hurting minorities, an
express racial classification must be subjected to strict scrutiny.
If one combines Schuette with the other cases on race-conscious school
admissions, one comes up with the following constitutional rule: Attempts
by the State to accord benefits on the basis of race will only be upheld if
narrowly tailored to promote compelling interests. However, if the State
passes a law expressly prohibiting state entities from according constitutionally permissible benefits to racial minorities, that prohibition will not
trigger close scrutiny.
Such a policy at least appears to be stacked against racial minorities,169
which might make individuals question whether members of the Court are
really committed to promoting equality and fair treatment.170 Schuette not
only ignores the past jurisprudence and denies minorities possible benefits,
but it may cause people to question either the integrity or the perspicacity of
various members of the Court. Schuette must be overruled at the first opportunity.

167

Girardeau A. Spann, Good Faith Discrimination, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 608 (2015)
(“The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, upholding
the Michigan anti-affirmative action voter initiative, provides another illustration of how the Court’s
holdings can be racially discriminatory.”).
168
See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1637 (“It is demeaning to the democratic process to presume that the voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.”).
169
See Spann, supra note 167, at 608 (“Schuette seems to have adopted a one-way ratchet approach to
affirmative action, pursuant to which the Supreme Court defers to the preferences of the political process
when the political process chooses to reject affirmative action, but invalidates the preferences of the political process when the political process chooses to adopt affirmative action.”).
170
Id. at 593 (“[I]t sometimes appears as if the Supreme Court is manipulating the two categories in
ways that end up legitimating racial discrimination.”).
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